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Abstract
In this paper, we present a mathematical model based on the queuing theory that simulates the examination process in a patent
office, including its relation with the applicants.  Through this statistical model, this study aims at evaluating the examination ef-
fort distribution among all examination stages, in order to establish the optimal examination condition, which means that a patent
application would be granted, denied or withdrawn in the shortest period of time and the backlog of patent offices would be re-
duced, meeting the society demand in a more efficient way.  This study also aims at evaluating the performance of a specific
patent examiner based on the optimal condition.   
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Introduction
One of the main drives of industry is innovation, generating
new services and products to be offered to society, leading en-
terprises and countries to economic growth and competitive
positions.
To ensure that this competitive advantage is sustainable, it is
vital to protect innovations against illegal copying through the
use of the patent system and patents itself.  A patent application
is a complex legal document that provides its owner with the
monopoly on exploration of a particular technology for a lim-
ited period of time, and it is an instrument to prevent com-
petitors from using the innovation developed and released by
this document.  Patents, as well as being used to establish a tem-
porary privilege of use of a particular technology, are still con-
sidered an asset on commercial trades and technology licensing.
They are also used to map the technological development of
suppliers, competitors and customers and they are a criterion
for evaluating investment in the stock market.
According to the USTPO (United States Patent and Trademark
Office), the economy of the United States presented an in-
crease of 100% in patent activity during the decades of 80 and
90, reflecting the increase of innovation and technology activi-
ties in the North American economy (King, 2001).  Considering
the increasing number of patent applications and the growing
complexity of these documents, more and more skill and time
are needed to retrieve information from databases of technol-
ogy data (Phillip, 2006), which leads to an increase in the patent
examiners’ workload (King 2001).
The first consequence of the work overload of the patent of-
fices is the delay in analyzing and granting patents, which results
in a backlog of patent applications to be examined. SINGH
(2007) defines the term backlog of patent applications as the av-
erage amount of time that a patent application takes to be
granted or denied, while the USPTO defines backlog as the pe-
riod of time between the filing date and the date which the
patent application is granted, denied or withdrawn.
The meaning of backlog may vary from patent office to patent
office (GAO, 1996), as it does from the United States patent
office to the European patent office (EPO) and the Japanese
patent office (JPO).  The USPTO considers that the examination
process begins at the moment the patent application is filed
and performs its backlog calculations based on the patent ap-
plications that are granted, denied or withdrawn, while the
Japanese and European office consider that the examination
process begins months or years after the filing and take account
the patent applications that are being examined to calculate the
backlog.  This fact means that the simple comparison of back-
log statistics information between different patent offices may
not be meaningful.
Another consequence of the work overload is that there can
be a reduction of examination quality and uncertainties re-
garding the intellectual properties rights (King, 2003). Once the
time and effort invested by patent examiners are the bottle-
necks for the examination of patent applications (King, 2001),
applicants1 and patent offices2 constantly work considering the
restriction of time, and are often not able to perform a mean-
ingful search in the state of the art, leading to both quality analy-
sis and granting of patents of dubious nature. This situation is
critical because it creates a vicious cycle which starts with an
increasing number of patents of poor quality, which causes a
greater difficulty in performing searches in the state of the art,
which in turn results in the granting of more patents of low
quality.
Despite the fact that the time spent on conducting an exami-
nation and consequently the examination capacity of a patent
office are closely related to the quality of the examinations and
quality of the patents granted, Batabyal and DeAngelo (2008)
and Batabyal and Nijkamp (2008) indicate that when patent ap-
plications are examined in a rigorous way, with higher quality of
examination and therefore taking more time, the patent office
examination capacity does not necessarily reduce. However,
these studies consider a restricted situation of patent analysis
and do not represent the current problem which most patent
offices face.
King (2001), on the other hand, establishes a statistical corre-
lation between the elements related to the patent examiner
and the examination process, determining which of these ele-
ments offer a greater contribution to the quality and quantity
of patents granted.  An important conclusion of this study, con-
firmed by King (2003), is the fact that the most important in-
puts to the examination process of patent applications are the
number of hours that the patent examiners invest in perform-
ing the examination and the attention given by them to the
patent application.
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1 It is called “applicants” the individuals or institutions responsible for writing and filing patent applications, who can be either an inventor or
an attorney that represents an inventor.
2 It is called “patent offices” the institutions responsible for examining and granting patent applications, such as the Brazilian INPI (National
Institute of Industrial Property), EPO (European Patent Office) or the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office).
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King (2003) presents another relevant issue to the quality of
the examination of patent applications: the procedures that the
patent examiner follows to analyze the documents.  Thus, both
the time spent on the patent application examination and the
procedures to carry out the analysis have an important role in
determining the quality of the patent over time.  Moreover, the
different amounts of time spent on the examination of patent
applications are mainly a consequence of the technological dif-
ferences in the patent applications.  These differences do not
change much with the increasing experience of the patent ex-
aminers but with the complexity of the technological field
(Popp, Juhl and Johnson, 2004), which makes it even more im-
portant to balance the productivity of the analysis and the qual-
ity of the examination.
Granting low quality patents results in additional problems for
the patent system, such as the costs involving oppositions, law-
suits and payments of high fees for licensing of technology, lead-
ing to possible unfair enrichment by low quality patent holders
and to an eventual delay and prevention of introduction of new
services and products in the market.  Nevertheless, low quality
patents may also adversely affect the patent holders, once it is
possible that after they make the necessary investments in the
industry based on the technology patented, these patents be
challenged and invalidated by one of their competitors.  One
way or another, the increase in costs leads to the reduction of
the rate of innovation, the reduction of the economy based on
patents and the average increase in market prices of patented
goods and services.
To avoid a costly and time-consuming lawsuit, the instrument of
opposition was created.  The opposition is characterized by a
request to review a decision3 of a patent application performed
by a patent office, being this review still a technical examina-
tion performed within the patent office.  This instrument has
also the objective of reducing the incentive to defensive patents,
which are a tool for reducing the rate of innovation (Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001).  When the results of the analysis and opposi-
tion of the patent application are not satisfactory for a party,
then a lawsuit is held in court.  Both the opposition and the
lawsuit are based on the assumption that, if previous informa-
tion disclosed by the state of the art is ignored by patent ex-
aminers, interested parties may challenge the validity of the low
quality or dubious merit patents (Graham et al., 2003).  In order
to illustrate this situation, Barton (2000) shows that in the year
2000 the number of lawyers specialized in intellectual property
in the United States grew more than research and development,
and that the legal costs related to the examination and patent
granting reached the average U.S.$ 10.000,00 while the legal
costs for the resolution of a lawsuit involving a patent reached
the average value of U.S.$ 1.500.000,00.
Another impact of oppositions and lawsuits on the backlog is
that, the more challenged the validity of patents are, the less avail-
able the patent examiners are for the examination of new patent
applications, increasing the work overload in the patent offices.
In theory, the completion of the examination with criteria and
attention reduces the need for a future review of the decisions
of patent applications, by both the patent office and the court.
Considering an ideal patent office, a patent granted would not
be lately revoked and the scope of its protection would be per-
fectly defined, providing quality information for an eventual law-
suit.  In this case, the reviewed and approved claims would have
full conditions to reward the applicant by the importance of his
invention, as well as providing information for the development
of enhancements and other related inventions.
On the other hand, the low quality of patent applications ex-
amination and consequently the quality of the examination re-
sults lead to a divergence of opinions between the patent
offices and the court decisions, resulting in a minor relevance
of the patent application examination and the patent itself in
court, which ultimately increases the uncertainty regarding the
intellectual property rights, the capacity of return on invest-
ment in research and developmental activities and the request
of privilege of patent (King, 2003).
The patent protection in these cases is guaranteed through a
lawsuit or through negotiation held between the parties under
the threat of a lawsuit, which means that the quality of the ex-
amination may reduce the amount of disputes, providing a
higher efficiency in industries where the patent protection is
vital for the business.
Meurer (1989) presents a study which indicates that the greater
the uncertainty regarding the validity of the patent, the greater
the occurrence of violations and lawsuits, being the validity of
the patent related to the quality of the examination.  King
(2003) reinforces this conclusion when he indicates that the
quality of the examinations of patent applications influences the
quality of patents granted and therefore the incentives for vio-
lations against these rights.  This means that the lower the qual-
ity of the examination of a granted patent, the greater the
likelihood of this right not be sustained in court, which can lead
to a greater number of infractions depending on the techno-
3 A patent application decision includes patent application granting or denying by the patent examiner and patent application withdrawing by
the applicant.
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logical field and on the economic aspects involving the indivi-
duals that are affected by this specific market monopoly.  This
study also indicates that the quality of the examination would re-
duce the amount of patents reviewed in court, reducing the prob-
ability of lawsuits, bringing benefits to the individuals involved in
the patent, providing more transparency and less uncertainty re-
garding intellectual property rights, creating incentives for inno-
vation and decreasing the costs and workload of the legal system
dedicated to judge intellectual property rights disputes.
To analyze the performance of the patent examination process,
a statistical modeling strategy based on the queuing theory is
proposed.  Through this model, this study aims at evaluating the
examination effort distribution among all examination stages4,
in order to establish the optimal examination condition, which
means that a patent application would be granted, denied or
withdrawn in the shortest period of time.  It also aims at eval-
uating the performance of a specific patent examiner based on
the optimal condition.  It is not an objective of this article to dis-
cuss patent quality, and it will be considered that all patent ap-
plication examinations will be performed with quality.
Queuing theory applied to patent examination mode-
ling
A system is defined by the queuing theory as a combination of
a queue where several customers wait for a service, and a serv-
ice, which can be provided by one or several servers process-
ing the customers in the queue.  Figure 1 illustrates a system
with one server according to the queuing theory.
Considering a system with m positions occupied by customers,
being position 0 the service position provided by a single server,
if a new customer arrives at the system, this customer will oc-
cupy position m, leaving the system with m+1 customers.  Figure
2 illustrates a customer arrival in a single server system.
By the end of the processing, the customer that occupies posi-
tion 0 leaves the system if the system is an open system, or re-
turn to the queue if the system is a closed system.  When the
customer leaves the service position, all customers in the queue
move one position forward, and the customer occupying posi-
tion 1 moves to position 0 and its processing starts.
It is important to underline that, for a specific system, there is
an order to provide the service to the customers that is given
by the order in which the customers arrive in the system.
Systems can mathematically be defined by G/G/n, in which the
first G represents a generic function that describes the cus-
tomer arrival process to the queue, the second G represents a
generic function that describes the customer processing by the
servers and n the number of servers processing customers.  If
the customer arrival and the services can be described as
Poisson processes, the G/G/n can be represented as an M/M/n
system.
Ross (2003) states that average properties can be defined for
a system defined by the queuing theory: L, which represents the
average number of customers in the system, LQ, which repre-
sents the average number of customers in the queue, W, which
represents the average amount of time that a customer remains
in the system and WQ, which represents the amount of time
that a customer remains in the queue.
Considering an M/M/1 open system, as in Figure 3, and assum-
ing that customers arrive at the system with an average rate λ
according to a Poisson distribution, the average time between
successive arrivals is 1/λ.  If the queue is empty, the customer
goes directly to the service position or waits in the queue if
this position is already occupied.  By the time the server finishes
processing one customer, this customer leaves the system and
the next customer, if there is any, enters the service position.
The average time between successive periods of service, ac-
cording to a Poisson distribution, is defined by 1/μ, where μ is
the average rate of customer processing.
For an M/M/1 open system, the average properties of the sys-
tem can be established as a function of the average customer
arrival rate λ and the average customer processing rate μ, as in
the following equations:
4 The “effort distribution among all examination stages” is the distribution of the limited work capacity of the patent examiner among the
first, the second, the third, etc, examination stages.
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These equations are valid only if the relation λ/μ is less than 1
(λ/μ <1), otherwise the number of customers in the system
would be infinity.
For a system consisting of P M/M/1 subsystems in series, as in
Figure 4, if the customer arrival in the first subsystem is de-
fined by λ, the output of subsystem j is the input of subsystem
j+1 and the service rate of the jth subsystem is defined by μj, the
average properties for each subsystem can be defined as in the
following equations (Ross, 2003):
As well as for a single system, these equations are valid only if
each service rate μj is a higher value than the customer arrival
rate μ at the first subsystem, which means that each relation
λ/μj must be less than 1 (λ/μj<1), otherwise the number of cus-
tomers in the series of subsystem would be infinity.
According to Burke’s Theorem, the split of a Poisson process
can be modeled as several parallel Poisson distributions (Bose,
2002).  Figure 5 illustrates Burke’s theorem applied to a division
of a Poisson process.
For a division of a Poisson process, the sum of fractions pj of
rate λ must be equal to 1, as in the following equation:
This theorem considers a balanced system, which means that
the input and the output rates of a subsystem j are the same or,
in other words, that the input and the output of subsystem j are
equal to λpj (Bose, 2002).  If the input and output present equal
rates, the service rate μj of subsystem j must be greater than
the input rate λpj, which means that the relation between the
input rate λpj and service rate μj must be less than 1 (λpj/μj<1).
Burke’s theorem can also be applied to a combination of
Poisson processes (Bose, 2002), as in Figure 6.
A consequence of Burke’s theorem would be the replacement
of parallel Poisson processes of input rate of λpj and service
rate of μj, as in Figure 7, for a single equivalent Poisson process
of input λ and service rate of μEQ, as in Figure 8.
Jackson’s theorem (Bose, 2002) is a variation of Burke’s theo-
rem and considers that, for a system consisting of M/M/1 sub-
systems, each individual M/M/1 subsystem j can be considered
an isolated system, and its average properties can be deter-
mined by equations 5 to 8 if this subsystem j is in equilibrium.
Being in equilibrium means that, for all subsystems, average
input rate λj, where 1≤j≤ N, must be lower than its average
service rate μj, which leads to the conclusion that the relation
between the input rate λj and the service rate μj must be lower
than 1 (λj/μj<1).  Also according to Jackson’s theorem, these
subsystems should behave as if they were independent, even if
they are not fully independent, and the combined distribution
must be obtained as a function of the individual distributions.
At last, the process of customer arrival for each subsystem
must be considered a Poisson distribution, even if it does not
entirely behave as one.
Based on these theorems, it is possible to build a model for
patent processing based on the queuing theory as a series of
M/M/1 subsystems, as in Figure 9, where PO represents a sin-
gle patent examiner of the patent office, APP the applicants, P
the number of examination stages, λ the average rate of new
patent applications arrival in the first examination stage, μij the
patent examination average rate of the jth stage of patent ex-
amination, μDj the applicant answering average rate of the
patent application examination performed during jth stage of
patent examination and pj the percentage of the rate of new
patent applications arrival in the first examination stage λ that
are granted, denied or withdrawn after stage j of patent exam-
ination.
This model considers that: a) the arrival of new patent applica-
tions is to be examined by one patent examiner, b) this patent
examiner examines patent applications in several patent ex-
amination stages and, c) for each stage, the oldest patent appli-
cations have priority to be examined.  This model also considers
that between two patent examination stages there is an inter-
mediate stage where the applicants have the opportunity to an-
swer the patent examiner analysis, and that after each
examination stage a percentage of the patent applications that
are examined are granted or denied by the patent examiner or
withdrawn by the applicants based on the examination per-
formed by the patent examiner, then leaving the system.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2008, Volume 3, Issue 4
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org)
JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT & INNOVATION © JOTMI Research Group 6
Although it is possible to extend this model to cover several
patent examiners, its focus is on the technical work of a single
patent examiner.  The applicants are regarded, in this model, as
being an equivalent single applicant, according to Burke’s theo-
rem.
Based on the model presented in Figure 9, it is possible to es-
tablish the average number of patent applications L in the sys-
tem and the average period of time W which a patent applica-
tion takes from the moment it enters into the system to the
moment it is granted, denied or withdrawn, as presented by the
following equations:
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2008, Volume 3, Issue 4
For this system, it is also possible to determine the average
number of patent applications to be analyzed by the patent ex-
aminer and the average period of time this patent examiner
takes to examine the patent applications in a specific examina-
tion stage j, as the following equations present:
As the system must be balanced according to Burke’s theorem,
it is necessary to correlate the average input rates of patent
applications of all subsystems and their related patent applica-
tions examination rates.  For an examination stage j, the relation
between the average examination rate μIj and the average rate
of new patent applications arrival in the first examination stage
λ is:
On the applicant side, for an answering stage j of patent appli-
cation analysis performed by the patent examiner, the relation
between the average rate of answers to the patent application
analysis performed during jth stage of patent examination and
the rate of new patent applications arrival in the first examina-
tion stage λ is:
As can be concluded from equation 14, the relation between
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org)
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the average examination rate μIj of examination stage j and the
average rate of new patent applications arrival in the first exa-
mination stage λ depends on the total percentage of patent ap-
plications that are granted, denied and withdrawn until
exa-mination stage j-1.  A similar conclusion can be drawn by an-
alyzing equation 15, which shows that the relation between the
answering average rate μDj of the patent application analysis
performed during jth stage of patent examination and the ave-
rage rate of new patent applications arrival in the first exami-
nation stage λ depends on the total percentage of patent
applications that are granted, denied and withdrawn until ex-
amination stage j.
Once a single patent examiner shares his examination capacity
among all patent examination stages, the sum of all average ex-
amination rates can be considered as the total average capac-
ity of this patent examiner, as in the following equation:
Results
To perform the analysis of patent examination effort distribu-
tion, consider two patent examiners that get to patent appli-
cations decisions by performing up to three examination stages,
with a decision profile as presented in Table 1 and an average
arrival rate of new patent applications in the first examination
stage of λ, where λ=3,5.
Both patent examiners perform, on average, 10,0 patent appli-
cation examinations per month, and the average examination ef-
fort distribution among the three patent examination stages
for patent examiner _ patent examiner 1 (µ1i) and patent ex-
aminer 2 (µ2i)_ are presented in Table 2.
Based on the information provided for each of the two patent
examiners, not only the average number of patent applications
on each examination stage L1i for patent examiner 1 but also
the average number of patent applications on each examina-
tion stage L2i for patent examiner 2 can be determined.  Table
3 presents these results.
It is also possible, based on the information provided for each
of the two patent examiners, to calculate the average amount
of time in months that a patent application spends on each ex-
amination stage W1i for patent examiner 1 and the average
amount of time in months that a patent application spends on
each examination stage W2i for patent examiner 2.  Table 4 pres-
ents these results.
Once the interest is to analyze the patent examiners’ distribu-
tion effort, it will be considered that the applicants spend four
months5 on average to answer to a patent examination.  Based
on this, the number of patent applications waiting for an an-
swer after each examination stage LDi is presented in Table 5.
By adding the total average number of patent applications for
patent examiners 1 and 2 presented in Table 3 with the total
number of patent applications waiting for an answer from the
applicants, it is possible to determine the total average number
of patent application that are under the responsibility of each
patent examiner.  Likewise, by adding the total average amount
of time that a patent application spends on all examination
stages to the total average amount of time the applicants spend
to answer all patent examinations, it is possible to determine
the average period of time a patent application spends in the
system until it is granted, denied or withdrawn.  Table 6 presents
these results.
According to the results presented in Table 6, it can be seen
that patent examiner 1 has on average 34% less patent applica-
tions on his responsibility than patent examiner 2 and that
patent examiner 1 can get to a patent application decision in
35% less of the time that patent examiner 2 can get on average.
Even being less efficient than patent examiner 1, patent exam-
iner 2 can process the incoming patent applications and meet
the society demand as well as patent examiner 1.
However, considering the decision profile presented in Table 1,
an average arrival rate of new patent applications in first ex-
amination stage of 3,5 (λ=3,5) and an average of 10,0 patent
application examinations per month, the best average exami-
nation effort distribution for a patent examiner would be the
one presented in Table 7.
As a result of this average examination effort distribution, the
best average number of patent application on each examina-
tion stage LBi and the best average amount of time a patent ap-
plication spends on each examination stage WBi are presented
in Table 8.
By adding these results to the total number of patent applica-
tions waiting for an answer from the applicants and the total a-
5 The period of four months was considered based on the Brazilian patent law, which establishes a limit of ninety days to the applicant to
answer to a patent application examination.
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verage amount of time the applicants spend to answer to all
patent examinations, it is possible to determine the total best re-
sult for the examination effort distribution presented in Table 9.
Comparing the best results that can be achieved with the re-
sults presented in Table 6, patent examiner 1 is able to improve
his results up to 12% and patent examiner 2 is able to improve
his results up to 34%, which means that, considering the deci-
sion profile presented in Table 1, an average arrival rate of new
patent applications in the first examination stage of 3,5 (λ=3,5)
and an average of 10,0 patent application examinations per
month, that is the best both of the patent examiners can do.
If we introduce a third patent examiner, considering s/he has
the decision profile as in Table 6, an average arrival rate of new
patent applications in the first examination stage of 3,5 (λ=3,5)
and a patent examination distribution effort as presented in
Table 10.
As Table 10 shows, the total average examination effort for the
third patent examiner is 8,0 patent examinations per month.
Considering this average examination effort distribution, the
average number of patent application on each examination
stage L3i for patent examiner 3 and the average amount of time
a patent application spends on each examination stage W3i for
patent examiner 3 are presented in Table 11.
Again, by adding these results to the total number of patent ap-
plications waiting for an answer from the applicants and the
total average amount of time the applicants spend to answer all
patent examinations, it is possible to determine the total re-
sults for the examination effort distribution of patent examiner
3, as presented in Table 12:
Comparing now the results for patent examiner 3 with the re-
sults for patent examiner 1, it can be seen that patent examiner
1 has on average 1% less patent applications on his responsi-
bility than patent examiner 3 and in terms of period of time to
a decision, patent examiner 1 can decide on average in a pe-
riod of time 2% shorter than patent examiner 3.  On the other
hand, patent examiner 3 has on average 33% less patent appli-
cations on his responsibility than patent examiner 2 and in
terms of period of time to a decision, patent examiner 3 can de-
cide on average in a period of time 33% shorter than patent
examiner 2, although patent examiner 2 performs on average
10,0 patent examinations per month while patent examiner 3
performs only 8,0 patent examinations per month.
Discussion
Work overload on patent offices leads to a backlog of patent
applications awaiting for examination, which results in a delay in
the decision whether to grant or to deny the application.  This
backlog causes the society to make pressure over the patent of-
fices to optimize their internal procedures in order to increase
the decision rate of patent applications.  This pressure over the
patent offices is reflected on the work of the patent examiners,
who end up investing less time in the examination of patent ap-
plications aiming at a higher productivity, which can lead to neg-
ative impacts on the quality of the examinations and
consequently on the quality of the patent granted.  And, as it
was previously mentioned, the granting of patents of poor qual-
ity leads to negative consequences to both patent offices and
society.
As an attempt to improve the performance of the examination
process without sacrificing the examination quality, this study
proposes a modelling strategy to analyse the patent examina-
tion effort distribution among the patent examination stages.
This modelling strategy is based on the queuing theory and
aims at simulating the entire examination process, from the mo-
ment the patent examiners begin examining a patent application
to the moment it is granted or denied by the patent office or
withdrawn by the applicants.  This model considers that the ex-
amination process of a patent application is performed by only
one patent examiner in a series of examination stages, and that
after each examination stage the applicants have the opportu-
nity to answer the patent examiner and provide subsidies to
the pursuit of the examination process.  Once a single patent
examiner is responsible for the analysis of patent application
through several examination stages, he/she must distribute
his/her examination capacity among the examination stages,
given a decision profile for this patent examiner and an average
rate of new patent applications arrival in the first examination
stage.  Without any kind of formal orientation, this patent ex-
aminer may distribute his/her examination capacity based on
heuristic criteria, which means that he/she may not be as pro-
ductive as he/she could be.
Based on the results achieved by applying this mathematical
model, it is possible to conclude that, because of a different dis-
tribution of the patent examiner examination effort among the
examination stages, a patent examiner can be significantly more
efficient than others. This means that the patent examiner will
have on his responsibility, on average, a smaller number of
patent applications once he is able to make a decision for a
patent application, on average, in a shorter period of time with-
out performing any additional examination effort.
It is also possible to conclude that, based on a specific decision
profile, there is a best patent examination effort distribution,
given the total average patent examination capacity, which
means that a patent examiner can not improve his perfor-
mance beyond a certain limit.
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Finally, the results also show that when a patent examiner per-
forms more patent examinations per unit of time, he is not nec-
essarily being more efficient, once the distribution of his
examination capacity among the patent examination stages may
not be efficient.  This means that another patent examiner, even
by performing less patent examinations per unit of time, can be
more efficient than this first one, if he distributes his examina-
tion capacity more efficiently.
As a conclusion of this study, this modelling strategy can be ap-
plied in any patent office that follows these examination pro-
cedures in order to improve its productivity only by guiding the
patent examiners to properly distribute their analysis capacity
among the examination stages, which would lead to the reduc-
tion of the backlog in the offices, meeting the society demand.
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Decision profile per examination stage 
Examination stage 1st 2nd 3rd 
ρi 45% 35% 20% 
 
Table 2 
Average examination effort distribution 
Examination stage 1st 2nd 3rd 
Patent examiner 1 (µ1i) 4,0 4,0 2,0 
Patent examiner 2 (µ2i) 6,0 2,0 2,0 
 
Table 3 
Average number of patent application on each examination stage 
Examination stage 1st 2nd 3rd TOTAL 
Patent examiner 1 (L1i) 7,0 0,9 0,5 8,4 
Patent examiner 2 (L2i) 1,4 25,7 0,5 27,6 
 
Table 4 
Average amount of time a patent application spends on each examination stage 
Examination stage 1st 2nd 3rd TOTAL 
Patent examiner 1 (W1i) 2,0 0,3 0,2 2,5 
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Patent examiner 2 (W2i) 0,4 7,3 0,2 7,9 
Table 5 
Average amount of patent applications waiting for an answer after each examination stage 
After examination stage 1st 2nd TOTAL 
Applicant (LDi) 14,0 14,0 28,0 
 
Table 6 
Total results for each patent examiner 
Parameter L W 
Patent examiner 1 36,4 10,5 
Patent examiner 2 55,6 15,9 
 
Table 7 
Best average examination effort distribution 
Examination stage 1st 2nd 3rd 
Best average examination effort distribution 5,3 3,2 1,5 
 
Table 8 
The best average number of patent applications on each examination stage and the best average amount 
of time a patent application spend on each examination stage 
Parameter 1st 2nd 3rd TOTAL 
LBi 1,9 1,5 0,9 4,3 
WBi 0,6 0,4 0,2 1,2 
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Total results for the best average examination effort distribution 
Parameter L W 
Best average examination effort distribution 32,3 9,2 
 
Table 10 
Average examination effort distribution for a third patent examiner 
Examination stage 1st 2nd 3rd 
Patent examiner 3 (µ3i) 4,5 2,5 1,0 
 
Table 11 
Average number of patent application on each examination stage and average amount of time a patent 
application spend on each examination stage for patent examiner 3 
Parameter 1st 2nd 3rd TOTAL 
L3i 3,5 3,4 2,3 9,2 
W3i 1,0 1,0 0,7 2,7 
 
Table 12 
Total results for patent examiner 3 
Parameter L W 
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